Becoming Virtuous (but not really)

[Note: I am typing my train of thought as it occurs...]

Aristotle defines virtue as the “golden mean,” between two extremes. If a person can perform an action that is between two extremes, then they are considered to be virtuous. These two extremes usually come in the form of excess and deficiency, and when a person performs an action that falls under either of these two categories, they are considered as such.

Aristotle also states that virtues can be practiced, so that an reproachable person may become virtuous. My problem with this is that a reproachable person would be either deficient or excessive. Furthermore, if the mean between the two vices is relative to each person, then how would a  deficient, stereotypical, nerd who desires to become a virtuous (competitive or professional) athlete become the virtuous person that they want to be?

To become virtuous, a person must practice virtuous actions, which means doing things that are just right for them. So then, I would suppose that our stereotypical nerd would have to begin by building endurance by participating in activities that would strengthen this attribute. One would say that if he becomes exhausted, he would have participated in the activity excessively; however if he feels fine after such activities, his actions would be considered deficient. But endurance, by definition, is one’s ability to resist becoming exhausted. Considering that this is a stereotypical nerd, who for whatever reason, is possessed to suddenly become an athlete, it is more than likely that he will become exhausted after participating in endurance building activities.

Aristotle also makes a point to say that anybody can participate in an activity, but it does not mean that they will be good at it, and that a good practitioner is virtuous because they perform their actions well, but a poor practitioner is reproachable for performing their actions poorly.

I personally dislike his definition, as at face value it leaves the possibility of becoming proficient/virtuous to chance, though obviously, one could be instructed how to perform these actions properly by a mentor. If we follow this train of thought of “a mentor must instruct you on how to do something virtuously,” then we have to ask ourselves how the first person who performed a task virtuously knew that it was virtuous. Furthermore, this would mean that virtue is an ascribed characteristic, meaning that it is something that is evaluated by other people. If one performs a task until the performance is acceptable to a mentor, then it defeats Aristotle’s definition of virtue in that it isn’t supposed to be something sought out for the approval of another person. This puts a person’s capacity for becoming virtuous back up to chance, as the only way for them to become virtuous is for them to perform an action, correctly, in just the right way for themselves.

All this to say that Aristotle does a very good job explaining his reasoning and building support for himself, but the main flaw that I find in his argument is his definition of what exactly “virtue,” is. If we were to use Aristotle's definition, then no practitioner of any activity today would be considered virtuous or proficient, as most activities that require practice require practice (excuse my redundancy) in order for one to be recognized as proficient/virtuous.